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Kalpana Wilson examines grassroots mobilisations in Bihar against an electoral victory for BJP’s prime
ministerial candidate Narendra Modi—and the Hindu right’s efforts to suppress them. 
The well-worn phrase ‘the world’s largest democracy’ is reached for repeatedly by journalists covering the current
Indian elections for the international media. Underlying it is the assumption that whatever the outcome of these
elections, it will be the choice of India’s people. Questioning this glib claim, many have pointed to the scale of
corporate backing for BJP prime ministerial candidate Narendra Modi and the unprecedented spending and PR
involved in his campaign as well as the bias of the media. But what does the electoral process itself look like on the
ground? Which local groups are Modi’s allies and how do they operate? And how are they being resisted?
CPI(ML) rally in Mairwa, Siwan, Bihar in May 2014
Bihar is a key state in this election. Observers suggest that the much-heralded ‘Modi wave’ has markedly failed to
materialise here (also see here). The reasons are complex, but as in a number of other states, it is the rural and
urban poor, Muslim communities and peasants from the ‘Other Backward Castes’, who have been mobilising
against a Modi victory. Much liberal commentary laments the alleged triumph of ‘caste’ affiliations over ‘development’
concerns in shaping the current Bihar polls. But in reality, questions that are central to development – questions of
the distribution of land and resources, and of the absolute necessity of meaningful democracy for people-centred
development – have been at the heart of the elections here.
Dalits and other poor communities are once again having to defend a hard-won battle for the right to cast their own
votes, denied them by higher caste landowners. The breakthrough in civil rights in Bihar came in the late 1980s and
1990s. Following a series of movements for decent wages, land redistribution and an end to rapes of Dalit women
by landlords who saw it as their birth right, large numbers voted for the CPI(ML), the revolutionary left party that led
these movements. As Shanti Devi, a Dalit woman agricultural labourer told me in 1996, “We got the courage to fight.
Things have changed, we answer back, we talk to them as equals.”
In 1994 Bhumihar landlords responded to this assertion by the rural poor of their right to vote by forming the Ranvir
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Sena. While Bihar was already known for the succession of violent caste armies set up by different landowning
groups, the Ranvir Sena was more organised, more heavily armed and funded than its predecessors, and
organically linked to the Hindu right. The horrific nature of the violence inflicted by the Ranvir Sena in a series of
massacres of  landless Dalit and Muslim women, children and men prefigured the massacres of Muslims in Gujarat
under Modi in 2002. But the connection doesn’t end there: like Modi, the Ranvir Sena’s founder Brahmeshwar Singh
was a lifelong cadre of the RSS, the fascist-inspired organisation at the heart of India’s Hindu right.
Leaflets circulated by the Ranvir Sena, characterised by hatred and demonisation of Muslims and Communists, are
taken directly from RSS tracts. Nitish Kumar, the incumbent chief minister, a favourite of the World Bank for his pro-
corporate neoliberal approach, and until recently in an alliance with the BJP, hastily disbanded the judicial
commission set up to probe the political links of the Ranvir Sena before its findings could be made public. But it is
common knowledge that while all the major parties utilised the Sena to try to crush the assertion of the rural poor
and its left leadership, its core loyalty remains with the BJP. Like many other armed and violent Hindu right-wing
organisations across the country, the Ranvir Sena is today a key ally for Modi on the ground.
CPI(ML) campaign in Ara, Bihar, in April 2014
What this means for democracy was demonstrated when the Ranvir
Sena reportedly assassinated two people days before polling in Ara
constituency: one was Budhram Paswan, a local CPI(ML) leader, himself
a Dalit. His killers fired shots in the air to mark his murder as a political
assassination and to terrorise those intending to vote for his party. The
other was a young Muslim teacher Akbar Khan, whom the Ranvir Sena
claimed to have murdered for cheering Pakistan during a cricket match.
His murder was an attempt to terrorise Muslims and – as has been the
BJP’s pre-election strategy in Uttar Pradesh and elsewhere – to
orchestrate Hindu-Muslim violence. In this case it failed because Akbar,
who taught poor children, both Hindu and Muslim, for free, and had
organised to keep the streets free of sexual harassment for schoolgirls,
was very popular among local people of all communities.
Since then, Bihar BJP leader Giriraj Singh has publicly announced that
opponents of Modi will have “no place in India” once he wins and should
“go to Pakistan”. Despite this level of intimidation, the CPI(ML) in Ara saw
hundreds of young people, including large numbers of young women,
walking from village to village to campaign for their youthful candidate
Raju Yadav. Among them was Rachna, a 20-year-old student from Ara
town, who explained that she was drawn to campaign by her concern for
issues of women’s freedom: “Here we are consulted, we’ve helped to shape the campaign – it’s a breath of fresh
air.”
While Modi has been forced to invoke his own ‘backward caste’ origins to try to broaden his appeal in Bihar, his
party’s base is still solidly upper caste and its campaign reeks of hostility to lower castes, Muslims and poor people.
Ara’s BJP candidate RK Singh, a former elite civil servant, referred on television to his “disgust” for “uneducated
people”, at the same time seeking to whip up hysteria by claiming knowledge of terrorist plots to kill Modi, a ploy
favoured by Modi himself. Ongoing court cases allege that Modi fabricated several plots to assassinate him during
his tenure as chief minister of Gujarat, leading to a number of staged killings by the police, including that of student
Ishrat Jahan.
In Bihar, since unexplained blasts during a Modi rally in Patna, Muslim communities have experienced a reign of
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terror in which teenage boys have been indefinitely detained without charge by the National Investigation Agency
(NIA) and tortured in an attempt to extract false confessions. This was the experience of 19-year-old Aslam Parvez
and his cousin Irfan Ansari from Arwal district. Along with several other youths from their village, both were severely
tortured in custody.  Ansari was told, “we’ll make sure no Muslim from Arwal ever gets a government job.” Parvez’s
father was also interrogated by NIA officers who asked, “why won’t you and your family vote for Modi?” This
highlights not only the NIA’s own institutionalised Islamophobia but also a disturbing level of political collusion with
the Hindu right’s agenda.
So what then of Modi’s alleged mass support among ‘young’ voters? Bihar presents a very different picture—of
young women like Rachna campaigning in defiance of Hindu right-wing terror; of young men in Parvez’s village
finding the courage to protest communal profiling, torture and criminalisation; and of a generation which wants a
very different kind of change from the rapid slide into fascism Modi promises.
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